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RIGHT OF THE WIDOW OF LESSEE TO DOWER IN OIL AND
GAS LEASES-VAN CAMP v. EVANS"'
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Van Camp V.
Evans,' decided in 1947, ruled that the widow of the lessee under a
certain oil and gas lease was not entitled to dower in her late husband's interest therein. The instrument by which the widow claimed
was denominated "Gas and Oil Lease" and contained the words,
"do hereby lease, grant and sell
for the purpose of entering
upon, operating thereon, and removing therefrom
oil and
gas
"
It provided that drilling was to begin within 15 days
from the granting of the lease, and that failure to comply with that
condition would operate as a forfeiture of all rights granted. No
duration for the lease was specified and it was provided that assignees might keep it "alive" by drilling as aforesaid. A royalty of
one-eighth of the oil and gas was reserved. The Court gave as its
reason for denying dower to the lessee's widow that the instrument
did not convey a fee simple estate in the oil and gas to the lessee,
declining to say what, in fact, was the nature of the interest passed.
The case raises interesting problems not directly discussed in the
Court's opinion, but which the writer thinks merit attention in connection with the result reached. It is thought an examination of
these problems will cast light upon significant factors which influenced the Court in arriving at its decision. Because the judgment
apparently rested upon the ground that the lessee did, not take
under the instrument an estate in fee simple, it might be queried
whether dower might have been awarded if the Court had found
that a determinable fee was thereby conveyed. The writer of
another note- in this Journal has answered this question in the affirmative, giving the subject able treatment, and concluding that
such was the nature of the interest created by the lease. Before proceeding to examine the factors which this writer thinks were responsible for the different results reached by the Court it might
prove interesting to look briefly at the problem of construction
involved in bringing a determinable fee within the Kentucky statute providing for dower.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Sec. 392.020, provides in part as follows: "After the death of either the husband or wife the survivor
shall have an estate for his or her life in one-third of all the real
estate of which the other spouse
was seized of an estate in fee
simple during the coverture
" Assuming that the interest passed
by the instrument in the Van Camp case constituted a determinable,
base, or qualified fee, a decision the Court did not reach, how could
* This note and the preceding one are companion notes.
'306 Ky 59, 20"6 S.W 2d 38 (1947)
"Note, 37 Ky. L. J., (1949).
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the term "fee simple" used in the Statute be held to embrace such an
estate? To answer the question reference must be made to the common law whereby a widow was endowed of a one-third interest for
life in all real estate of which her husband was seized of an estate of
inheritance (fee) during the. coverture. It will be noticed that
"estate of inheritance", not "fee simple", was the phrase used at com3
mon law to designate an estate which was subject to dower. That it
was the purpose of Sec. 392.020 to put the husband in the same situation as the wife with respect to dower rights has been decided.' But
was it also its purpose to restrict dower to only those estates of inheritance owned in fee simple? Apparently the Court of Appeals
thought not, for decisions' rendered after enactment of the Statute
have followed a decisione rendered prior to its enactment which
recognized the right of a widow to dower in a determinable fee.
Although the courts for some purposes do not distinguish between different kinds of fees it is well recognized that a fee simple
is not the same as a determinable, base, or qualified fee. A fee
simple is an estate without conditions or limitations which may
abridge or defeat the fee. "It is the largest possible estate which a
man can have, being an absolute estate. It is where lands are given
to a man and to his heirs absolutely, without any end or limitation
put to the estate."' On the other hand, a determinable, base, or qualified fee is a limited estate of inheritance in that its duration is made
to depend upon some condition imposed by the grantor, which in
the event it is fulfilled, or not, as the case may be, the estate in the
grantee determines and is lost to him. While the grantor gives all
that he has, retaining only a possibility of reverter, yet the estate is
liable to determine upon a contingency.? It cannot be said to be absolute or simple because it is restricted and complicated by a qualification. Coke commented upon this distinction as follows:
"Of fee simple, it is commonly holden that there
be three kinds, viz. fee simple absolute, fee simple conditional and fee simple qualified or a base fee. But the
more genuine and apt divisions were to divide fee, that
is, inheritance, into three parts, viz. simple or absolute,
conditional and qualified or base. For this word
(simple) property excludeth both conditions and limitations, that defeat or abridge the fee."'"
WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

REAL PROPERTY

(2d ed. 1927) sec. 97; TIFFANY,

(Abridged ed. 1940) sec. 320.

'See Brand's Exr. v. Brand, 109 Ky. 721, 725, 60 S.W 704, 705
(1901).
'Landers v. Landers, 151 Ky. 206, 151 S.W 386 (1912), Rice v.
Rice, 133 Ky. 406, 118 S.W 270 (1909).
'Northcut v. Whipp, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 65 (1851).

BouviEf's LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1914) p.
WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927)

72

8

Ibid.

" Co. LIrT. * lb.

1199.
sec. 86.
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Why then should the Court of Appeals overlook the distinction

between fees simple and determinable fees by granting dower in
both when the Statute expressly provides for dower only in the
former 9 It cannot be doubted that a strict interpretation would exclude dower in determinable fees. It is submitted that the liberal interpretation which has been applied depends in part upon the fact
that the law favors dower. This with some of its ramifications is
stated by one Court as follows:
"Dower, being a cherished and immediate jewel of

of the common law, preserved and presented to us in a

statutory setting, all doubts are to be resolved in its
favor, courts will not allow the right of dower to be
wasted and frittered away in piecemeal by sour or austere construction, by over-nice refinement in gloss, in
short, nothing except a plain mandate of the statute,
or a statutory command deduced by necessary implication, will suffice to set dower to one side.
the law
lifts the light of a comfortable contenance (sic) thereon
out of tender regard for the widow.""
Behind this overt favoritism are common sense considerations. It
is realized that some provision for the maintenance of widows and
the education of their children is necessary if they are not to become
public charges, dependent upon the community for gratuitous
support.
It might appear in view of the high esteem with which the law
has regarded dower that the Court in the Van Camp case should
have awarded that benefit to the claimant widow by holding that
the instrument there involved granted a determinable fee. In the instant case this would have been a fee subject to determination upon
failure of the grantee or his assigns to drill wells within the stipulated time. However, this could not have been done without altering
a considerable portion of the law as will hereafter appear.
Substantial disagreement exists in the courts as to the nature
of property in oil and gas while they remain in place under the soil
and as to the effect of instruments conveying rights thereto. Some
courts have held that no ownership in these minerals in place is
possible, but that title attaches only upon removal of the substances
from the earth, that is, reduction to possession.2 Others have concluded that oil and gas are subject to absolute ownership in place
so long as they remain there." The difficulty which has caused the
courts to arrive at conflicting conclusions arises from the fact that
both oil and gas are fugitive substances which commonly change
,position under the earth-moving from one man's land to that of
another. Where such movement has, in fact, occurred the courts
" See Chrisman v Linderman,
1092 (1907).
'Lindley v. Raydure, 239 Fed.
Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N.E. 809
" Texas Co. v Daugherty, 107

202 Mo. 605, -,

100 S.W 1090,

928 (E. D. Ky 1917), State v.
(1898).
Tex. 226, 176 S.W 717 (1915).
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have agreed that the owner of the land from whence they ngrated
is divested of all rights therem.' But what if a particular deposit of
oil and gas does, in fact, remain stationary in a given tract of land?
Does the mere possibility of its migrating preclude ownership? In
Kentucky the question has been answered in the negative. It is held
that oil and gas in place are subject to absolute ownership so long as
they remain in the land of the owner.' Although this rule is perhaps
convenient it would seem to do violence to the common law concept
of a fee simple estate consisting of rights which can only be divested
by a conveyance or demise of the fee. The difficulty inherent in
holding that a fee may attach to substances which can move under
the earth in such manner as to divest the owner of all his rights is
8
apparent."
Yet, as a practical matter, this rule may be expedient.
Since it is clear in Kentucky that oil and gas in place are objects of ownership and are a part of the land, it follows that one
who holds the land in fee simple can by an appropriate instrument
(deed) convey his title to the minerals in place, thereby creating
a severance of the realty into surface and subsurface estates owned
by the respective parties in fee simple. Thus in Trimble v. Kentucky
7
River Coal Corporation where the deceased husband had purchased
outright oil, gas, coal, and other minerals underlying the land of
another, and later had resold half of what he had purchased, the
Court held in a suit for partition and assignment of dower that the
property should be sold, and that the widow was entitled to dower
in all of the minerals which had been originally conveyed to her
husband. The Court said:
.6
the purchaser of oil, gas, coal, or other mineral
rights by his purchase acquires not only a right to
go upon the property and take the designated subthese oil,
substances themselves as they lie in place,
gas, coal and mineral rights are real estate owned in
fee simple."'"
Whereas the above quotation represents the Kentucky rule with
respect to outright conveyances by deed a different rule prevails
as to the rights acquired by virtue of a lease transaction. In Swiss
21Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685,
75 S.W 2d 204 (1934), Brown v Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 39 L. Ed.
304, 15 Sup. Ct. 245 (1895) see Peoples Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind.
277, 31 N.E. 59, 60 (1892).
"Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky 685,
-75 S.W 2d 204 (1934) Trinble v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation,
235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W 2d 367 (1930), Adams v. Elkhorn Coal Corporation, 199 Ky. 612, 251 S.W 654 (1923), Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440,
215 S.W 81 (1919).
"For an interesting discussion of this matter see Westmoreland
& Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. St. 235, 18 Atl. 724
(1889)
7235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W 2d 367 (1930)
11id. at 306, 31 S.W 2d at 369.
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Oil Corporationv. Hupp" the rule applicable to the latter was stated.
Although the Court admitted that the lessee under an oil and gas
lease acquires an interest in land, it ruled that the rights of such

lessee are restricted to exploring and producing oil and gas upon
the land, and that he gets no title to the minerals until he has reduced them to possession by removing them from the earth.

Thus it is apparent that the law distinguishes between outright
conveyances of minerals by deed and rmneral leases, for the pur-

pose of ascertaining the rights acquired under the respective instruments. The rights created by the latter are classified by some courts
as profits a prendre which are incorporeal hereditaments.'
The writer suggests that the real question in the Van Camp case
was one of construction. Did the particular instrument there involved
constitute a deed, as in the Tnrmble case, or was it, in fact, a lease
to be governed by the law announced an Swiss Oil Corporation
v. Hupp? To arrive at its conclusion it was necessary for the Court
tQ apply general principles of construction which had acquired
sanction by usage and which had been frequently employed to decide analogous cases. It has beei held that the whole instrument
should be examined to determine the intention of the parties,2 ' and
that the formal name appearing on the writing is not controlling.
Thus instruments in the form of deeds and so denominated have been
held leases," and instruments purporting to be leases have been
held deeds.' The real question is, What does the writing show the
parties were attempting to do?
Perhaps the best cases illustrating the application of this principle are those which involved the effect of non-use of the premises
granted or leased to extract the minerals therein. If the instrument
in question is a deed, the rule is that the grantee.is under no obligation to extract the minerals in order to perpetuate his rights, and
non-use will not divest them." But if the instrument is a lease, the
law implies a condition that wells or mines must be sunk within a
" 253 Ky. 552, 564, 69 S.W 2d 1037, 1043 (1934)
'Federal Oil Co. v Western Oil Co., 112 Fed. 373 (D. Ind. 1902),
Rich v. Doneghey 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918), see Trimble v.
Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 235 Ky 301, 305, 31 S.W 2d 367,
369 (1930).
" Kentucky Natural Gas Corporation v. Carter, 303 Ky. 559, 198
S.W 2d 311 (1946) Williamson v Williamson, 223 Ky. 589, 4 S.W
2d 392 (1928)
'Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v Milliner, 234 Ky. 217, 27 S.W
2d 937 (1930).
"Kennedy v. Hicks, 180 Ky. 562, 203 S.W 318 (1918), Barnsdall v Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
'Duncan v. Mason, 239 Ky. 570, 39 S.W 2d 1006 (1931), Adams
v. Elkhorn Coal Corporation, 199 Ky 612, 251 S.W 654 (1923);
Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W 81 (1919).
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reasonable time, and failure of the lessee to comply constitutes an
abandonment or forfeiture of his rights.
In order to determine whether the parties intended a grant or a
mere lease the Court has examined the method of payment. Where
an instrument acknowledged receipt of a merely nominal consideration, and royalties reserved upon the minerals which might be
mined represented the only possibility by which the grantor could
receive a reasonable quid pro quo, the instrument was for that
reason held to be a lease, requiring that the lessee develop the
premises or forfeit his rights.' Another factor which has influenced
the Court to hold that a particular writing was a lease was the
presence of some fixed duration for the rights created, which indicated that the parties did not intend to convey a fee.' But where
an instrument contains the words, "grant, bargain, and sell" coupled
with words of inheritance the Court will treat it as effecting a sale
in the absence of inconsistent provisions contained therem.'
The instrument before the Court in the Van Camp case was
entitled "Gas and Oil Lease" and it provided that the lessors
leased, granted, and sold. Whether the initial consideration paid by
the lessee was substantial or merely nominal does not appear, but
the reserved royalties were substantial, being one-eighth of the
oil and gas. In addition it was expressly provided that the lessee
should lose his rights for failure to begin drilling within 15 days.
Although the Court did not say that this writing constituted only a
lease, it is apparent that the written opinion placed great weight upon
the forfeiture clause which would divest the lessee of his rights in
the event of non-use. Had not the Court decided in previous cases
that a lease implies a condition that mines must be opened by the
lessee if he is not to abandon or forfeit his rights? Since a lease indicates the presence of that condition, does not that condition expressed in an otherwise uncertain instrument indicate the intention
to lease? Certainly the Court had ruled in analogous cases, deciding
the effect of non-use of the premises upon the rights conveyed, that
a grant or sale imposed upon the grantee no obligation to act upon
the premises, even though a royalty had been reserved in the miner'
als which might have been mined.
"Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner, 234 Ky 217, 27 S.W
2d 937 (1930) Eastern Kentucky Mineral & Timber Co. v. SwannDay Lumber Co., 148 Ky. 82, 146 S.W 438 (1912), Cram v Pure
Oil Co., 25 F 2d 824 (C.C.A. 8th, 1928)
2 Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner, 234 Ky. 217, 27 S.W
2d 937 (1930).
'Williamson v. Williamson, 223 Ky. 589, 4 S.W 2d 392 (1928).
'Kentucky Natural Gas Corporation v Carter, 303 Ky. 559, 198
S.W 2d 311 (1946), Duncan v. Mason, 239 Ky. 570, 39 S.W 2d 1006
(1931).
'Duncan v Mason, 239 Ky 570, 39 S.W 2d 1006 (1931), Adams
v. Elkhorn Coal Corporation, 199 Ky. 612, 251 S.W 654 (1923).
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In conclusion the writer suggests that the Court thought the
instrument in the principal case constituted a lease, that the lessee's
rights were restricted to exploring and producing oil and gas upon
the land, and that the fee in the minerals remained in the lessor
until reduced to the physical possession of the lessee by extraction.
The lessee did not therefore, receive a grant of the fee to the minerals in place, and consequently there was no estate in fee owned by
the lessee to which dower rights could attach.
In rationalizing its position assumed in the instant case with
the holding in Pursifull's Admx. v. Pursifull," the only Kentucky
case expressly stating that a widow is entitled to dower in a gas and
oil lease, the Court said that the statement there made was not
necessary to the" decision and was not controlling. Further, it was
of the opinion that the Court in the Pursifull case regarded the instrument there involved as effecting outright sales of the gas and
oil in place.
NORRIS W

'299

Ky. 245, 184 S.W 2d 967 (1944).
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